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INTRODUCTION
As of 2014, an estimated 575,000 undocumented immigrants
called Houston, Texas home—making Houston the third largest
major U.S. metropolitan area in terms of its total unauthorized
immigrant population.1 The Dallas, Fort Worth, and Arlington,
Texas metropolitan area ranked right behind Houston, with an
estimated 475,000 undocumented immigrants living there in 2014.2
Then, against the backdrop of increased enforcement of immigration
laws in Texas, came Hurricane Harvey in August 2017.3
Prior to Harvey’s arrival, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
released a joint statement assuring residents that “[r]outine non-
criminal immigration enforcement operations will not be conducted
at evacuation sites, or assistance centers.”4 Although this comported
with ICE and CBP’s practices during other recent hurricanes,5
many undocumented immigrants nonetheless feared that heading
to a hurricane shelter would put them at a substantial risk for
deportation—placing many of them in a life-threatening predica-
ment.6
1. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas Are Home to Six-in-Ten Unauthorized
Immigrants in U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/
02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/A4ZM-HS9A].
2. Id.
3. See Simon Romero & Miriam Jordan, It Was an Uneasy Time for Immigrants in Texas.
Then the Rains Came., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/us/
immigration-harvey-border-patrol.html [https://perma.cc/KKG3-Q5WS].
4. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., CBP and ICE Statement Regarding
Hurricane Harvey (Aug. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Hurricane Harvey Joint Statement], https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2017/08/25/cbp-and-ice-statement-regarding-hurricane-harvey [https://
perma.cc/4PLY-SQ3V].
5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE-CBP Joint Message Regarding
Hurricane Isaac (last published Aug. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Hurricane Isaac Joint Statement],
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/ice-cbp-joint-message-regarding-hurricane-isaac
[https://perma.cc/NP66-6CQV]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ICE-CBP Joint
Message Regarding Hurricane Matthew (Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Hurricane Matthew Joint
Statement], https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/06/ice-cbp-joint-message-regarding-hurricane-
matthew [https://perma.cc/Z3Z2-9QQB]. 
6. See Lorena O’Neil, An Undocumented Journey Through Harvey, ESQUIRE (Aug. 31,
2017), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a57277/undocumented-immigrant-hurricane-
harvey/ [https://perma.cc/SE9D-X535]. Many attribute this fear to CBP’s refusal to close its
roadside immigration checkpoints in Texas prior to Hurricane Harvey’s arrival. See, e.g.,
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Take, for example, the story of Maria, an undocumented immi-
grant living in Houston during Hurricane Harvey.7 The hurricane’s
floodwaters began to seep into Maria’s home faster and faster.8 But
after restlessly waiting for over three hours for rescuers to reach her
and her loved ones, Maria realized that she needed to act.9 With her
wheelchair-bound friend and three younger children situated in an
inflatable kiddie pool, Maria led her family for seventy-five minutes
through frigid, chest-deep floodwaters to the local hurricane shel-
ter.10 Yet the floodwaters did not scare Maria the most.11 Instead,
Maria wondered what would happen when she reached the shel-
ter—would they ask her for papers?12 Despite fearing that the choice
to head to the shelter may leave her five American-born children
without parents, she continued on.13
Less than two weeks later, Florida found itself bracing for
Hurricane Irma, “one of the strongest Atlantic hurricanes ever
observed.”14 Just days before Irma’s life-threatening impact,15 Sher-
iff Grady Judd of the Polk County Sheriff ’s Office took to Twitter to
make this proclamation to Polk County, Florida residents: “If you go
to a shelter for #Irma, be advised: sworn [law enforcement officers]
will be at every shelter, checking IDs. Sex offenders/predators will
not be allowed.”16 In a follow-up tweet, Sheriff Judd reiterated: “If
you go to a shelter for #Irma and you have a warrant, we’ll gladly
escort you to the safe and secure shelter called the Polk County
Romero & Jordan, supra note 3.







14. Elizabeth Djinis, It’s Time to Prepare as Hurricane Irma Threatens Florida, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIB. (Sept. 5, 2017, 8:56 PM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20170905/its-
time-to-prepare-as-hurricane-irma-threatens-florida [https://perma.cc/5DWW-8ATE].
15. Christine Hauser, Florida Sheriff Plans to Check for Warrants at Hurricane Shelters,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/us/polk-sheriff-hurricane-
florida.html [https://perma.cc/Q9XG-QQNR].
16. Polk County Sheriff (@PolkCoSheriff), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://
twitter.com/PolkCoSheriff/status/905438093527928834 [https://perma.cc/VH8N-EVNS].
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Jail.”17 A Polk County Sheriff ’s spokeswoman later clarified that
officials would not be checking entrants’ immigration status.18
Sheriff Judd’s tweets sent shockwaves throughout the country,19
and the policy was even subject to a lawsuit in Florida state court.20
According to court documents, Polk County officers stationed them-
selves outside of Polk County shelters, stopped every individual
seeking entry, and gave each person two options: provide a valid,
state-issued ID so that officers could run a warrant check, or provide
fingerprints for later analysis.21 Plaintiffs sought to have this prac-
tice declared unconstitutional, claiming that these “checkpoints”
were unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.22 One Polk County Sheriff ’s official characterized the
lawsuit as “frivolous and without merit.”23
The decisions Texas and Florida officials made during Hurricanes
Harvey and Irma, respectively, raise two seemingly unprecedented
constitutional issues—both of which this Note will address. First,
does the Constitution allow states and/or the federal government to
establish “checkpoints” to screen entrants to state-sponsored nat-
ural disaster shelters for outstanding arrest warrants? The Fourth
Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,”24 yet the Supreme Court permits suspicionless seizures at
17. Polk County Sheriff (@PolkCoSheriff), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2017, 7:31 AM), https://
twitter.com/PolkCoSheriff/status/905438240278278144 [https://perma.cc/ZXN4-RBUZ].
18. Hauser, supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., AJ Willingham, Sheriff Says Those with Warrants Should Go to Jail; Not a
Hurricane Shelter, CNN (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/06/us/polk-
county-sheriff-irma-tweets-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/9JPK-PRRK].
20. See Complaint ¶ 1, Libre by Nexus v. Judd, No. 2017CA-003170-0000-00 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
filed Sept. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Nexus Complaint], https://pro.polkcountyclerk.net/PRO/
PublicSearch/PublicSearch [https://perma.cc/P4N6-XNKK] (select “Public Access,” then select
“Circuit Civil” under the “Court Types” heading, then enter the case number identified above
in the “Uniform Case Number” text box). The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on
March 23, 2018. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Libre by Nexus, No. 2017CA-003170-0000-
00 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 23, 2018) (for directions to access this material, see id.).
21. Nexus Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 29-32. 
22. Id. ¶¶ 4, 40-43, 48.
23. Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Florida Sheriff Sued After Threatening to Scour Hurricane
Shelters for Criminals, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-nation/wp/2017/09/11/florida-sheriff-sued-after-threatening-to-scour-hurricane-shelters-
for-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/39V8-QG8D]. Notably, the official conceded to not having read
the lawsuit. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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state-implemented checkpoints if both the “gravity of the public
concerns” at stake and the checkpoint’s ability to further that public
interest outweigh the checkpoint’s intrusiveness into personal lib-
erties.25 With the number of outstanding arrest warrants in large
cities across the country ranging from 70,000 to 1.8 million,26 the
legality of general welfare shelter checkpoints likely would sub-
stantially influence whether hundreds of thousands decide to seek
shelter from a natural disaster.
Second, does the Fourth Amendment allow ICE agents to enter
a natural disaster shelter and inquire as to the occupants’ citizen-
ship status? Immigration status enforcement has not yet occurred
at natural disaster shelters.27 However, given President Trump’s
approach to immigration issues,28 ranging from promises to build a
wall on the U.S.-Mexico border29 to the administration’s controver-
sial immigrant family separation policy,30 it is entirely feasible that
ICE or CBP would change its policy regarding natural disaster
shelters and begin checking entrants’ immigration status during the
next natural disaster.31 Therefore, it is important to explore the
25. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
26. Nick Selby, The Backlog: Misdemeanor Arrest Warrants in the USA, MEDIUM (Oct. 6,
2014), https://medium.com/@nselby/the-backlog-misdemeanor-arrest-warrants-in-the-usa-213
145467db2 [https://perma.cc/M4CG-ZCK7]. Additionally, there are an estimated 789,000
outstanding arrest warrants in the FBI’s National Crime Information Center database.
Thousands Run Free Despite Warrants, ABC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/
GMA/story?id=125876&page=1 [https://perma.cc/PN3L-99H5].
27. See, e.g., Hurricane Harvey Joint Statement, supra note 4; Hurricane Isaac Joint
Statement, supra note 5; Hurricane Matthew Joint Statement, supra note 5.
28. See, e.g., President Donald J. Trump, State of the Union Address to the Congress




30. See Camila Domonoske & Richard Gonzales, What We Know: Family Separation and
“Zero Tolerance” at the Border, NPR (June 19, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
06/19/621065383/what-we-know-family-separation-and-zero-tolerance-at-the-border [https://
perma.cc/MT9D-UJTV]. 
31. Compare Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Border Patrol Checkpoint
Operations During Hurricane Harvey (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
speeches-and-statements/border-patrol-checkpoint-operations-during-hurricane-harvey
[https://perma.cc/2XX5-A8SQ] (“U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints in the path of Hurricane
Harvey in Texas will close as state highways close.”), with Hurricane Matthew Joint
Statement, supra note 5 (“[T]here will be no immigration enforcements ... including the use
of checkpoints for immigration enforcement.”).
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constitutionality of this practice now, before another natural disas-
ter threatens the lives of thousands because they fear deportation.
This Note will address both of these constitutional concerns in the
hypothetical implementation of both “warrant checkpoints” and im-
migration status enforcement at a natural disaster shelter. In this
scenario, a state-sponsored natural disaster shelter employs law
enforcement officers to perform warrant checks on each entrant
prior to admission, turning away those who choose not to partici-
pate. Then, while entrants are inside the shelter, ICE agents per-
form sweeps of the shelter, looking for any entrants that are
potentially in the country unlawfully.
The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I will provide a brief
layout of the applicable Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
establish the relevant analytical framework for subsequent Parts.
Part II will address “warrant checkpoints” at natural disaster
shelters, analyzing first whether a seizure occurs.32 Concluding that
a seizure does occur in checking each entrant for a warrant prior to
entry,33 Part II subsequently analyzes the reasonableness of that
seizure, and ultimately determines that the goal of the “check-
point”—which can only be characterized as furthering the State’s
interest in general crime prevention—is not sufficient to justify such
suspicionless seizures.34 Part III then analyzes the constitutionality
of the situation when ICE agents enter a natural disaster shelter
and interact with its occupants, asking questions designed only to
determine citizenship status. This Part concludes that under the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, such questioning by ICE agents is
likely a consensual encounter that does not amount to a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.35
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROSCRIPTION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEIZURES
In order to understand how best to analyze the constitutionality
of natural disaster shelter checkpoints, as well as immigration
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part III.C.
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status enforcement within natural disaster shelters, one needs to
first understand what a “seizure” is under the Fourth Amendment,
what a “reasonable” seizure is, and how checkpoints comport with
those constitutional safeguards.
A. What Is a “Seizure”?
Before attempting to set out which seizures the Fourth Amend-
ment does and does not permit, one must define what exactly
constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.36 As the
Supreme Court has made clear, “a seizure does not occur simply
because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.”37 It is important, then, to understand where the Court
draws the line between a “consensual encounter”38 and a seizure.
A seizure occurs under the Fourth Amendment “when there is a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied.”39 Typically, the “means” is either some appli-
cation of “physical force,” or some “show of authority” to which a per-
son submits.40 Any application of physical force—even when
unsuccessful in subduing a person—is sufficient to constitute a
seizure.41 An officer’s show of authority, however, is not by itself
sufficient to give rise to a seizure.42 A person must submit to an
officer’s show of authority before such assertion transforms the
encounter into a seizure.43 A police officer seizes a person, then,
when he “accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away”44 but not when the officer approaches an individual who runs
away.45 In the latter situation, no seizure occurs until officers
physically control the fleeing individual.46
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
37. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
38. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (per curiam).
39. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
40. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1991).
41. Id. at 624.
42. Id. at 626.
43. Id. 
44. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
45. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
46. Id. at 629.
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Whether a show of authority is enough to affect a seizure is a fact-
intensive inquiry that requires courts to analyze the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged seizure.47 Courts must deter-
mine whether a reasonable person, in those facts and circum-
stances, would have felt free “to disregard the police and go about
his business”48 or otherwise ignore the officer’s questioning.49 If the
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a reasonable person,
measured objectively from the perspective of a law-abiding citizen,50
would have felt free to disregard the officer’s questions, then there
is no seizure.51 These situations, often referred to as “consensual
encounters,” do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.52 Factors that
courts consider in this analysis include, but are not limited to,
whether (1) the officer made any physical application of force, over-
whelming show of force, or other intimidating movements; (2) the
officer issued commands or otherwise spoke in an authoritative tone
of voice; (3) the officer had a weapon and/or a badge; and (4) the
officer blocked any exits.53
B. What Is an “Unreasonable” Seizure?
The text of the Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the
people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.”54
It is important to emphasize that the Fourth Amendment requires
only that seizures be reasonable;55 there is no bright-line rule
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant before seizing a
person.56 Thus, the relevant question becomes whether the seizure
in question is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.57
47. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
48. Id. (quoting Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628).
49. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id. at 436-37.
52. See, e.g., id. at 434 (quoting Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) (per curiam)).
53. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also United States v. Griffith, 533 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.
2008) (listing additional factors). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
55. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
56. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
57. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990).
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When the police seize a person who is walking along the street,
courts require that the police have reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the person was engaging, or was about to engage in, criminal
activity.58 Law enforcement must form that reasonable, articulable
suspicion with objective facts and observations so that a judge may
later evaluate the seizure’s constitutional validity.59 “Anything less
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a
result [that the Supreme] Court has consistently refused to sanc-
tion.”60 Because of these concerns, seizures are ordinarily unreason-
able when not supported by any individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.61
With the general framework for determining whether an en-
counter with the police rises to the level of an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment set out, this Note turns next to estab-
lish the analytical framework necessary for determining whether a
checkpoint is an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment.
C. Checkpoints as Constitutional (or Unconstitutional) “Seizures”
The Supreme Court recognizes the “well established” fact “that a
vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”62 This conclusion is in-
escapable, because in operating a highway checkpoint, the police
intentionally station themselves on a public road and stop each car
driving on that road, not allowing the traveler to continue until the
police say that the person is free to continue.63
The Court, however, treats checkpoints as a “limited” exception
to the general rule that a seizure must be supported by some
individualized suspicion.64 Though a checkpoint allows the police to
58. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
59. Id. at 21-22.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
62. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); see Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450;
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
63. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989). 
64. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
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stop every motorist traveling on a road indiscriminately, the very
fact that the police stop everyone puts a motorist on notice that
they, too, will be stopped.65 This advance notice results in the
motorist being “much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the
intrusion” the checkpoint causes.66 Yet this reduced annoyance does
not vitiate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary
invasions of privacy.67 In analyzing whether a checkpoint is
constitutional, then, “it is necessary to balance the individual’s
privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to deter-
mine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion.”68
In performing this balancing test, courts must analyze three
factors. First, the court must consider “the gravity of the public
concerns served by the seizure.”69 Next, the court must take into
account “the degree to which the seizure advances the public inter-
est.”70 Finally, the court must balance the strength of the first two
factors against “the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.”71 Weighing the interests is necessary to “assure that an in-
dividual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbi-
trary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers.”72
Under this balancing test, the Supreme Court has upheld DUI73 and
border74 checkpoints as reasonable seizures, but has struck down
narcotics checkpoints on highways75 and random spot checks for a
motorist’s license and registration as unreasonable seizures.76
Specifically concerning the public interest being served, the
Supreme Court has never approved a checkpoint “whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”77
65. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975).
66. Id. at 895.
67. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). 
68. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) (quoting Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989)).
69. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
70. Id. at 51.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55.
74. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 553, 561-62 (1976).
75. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
76. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979).
77. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
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Instead, “each of the checkpoint programs that [the Court has]
approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related
to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring
roadway safety.”78 In considering whether the public interests that
the checkpoint serves satisfy the “exception[ ],” courts should “con-
sider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection to
the particular law enforcement practices at issue.”79 If the primary
purpose of the checkpoint appears to be “general crime control,” the
Supreme Court is “particularly reluctant” to recognize that check-
point as valid.80
When determining the degree to which the checkpoint serves the
purported public interest, courts are cautioned against substituting
their judgment of effective alternative measures for the judgment
of those “politically accountable officials” responsible for implement-
ing the checkpoint.81 Though an analysis of the checkpoint’s effec-
tiveness is warranted, courts must recognize that “the choice among
such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental
officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility
for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police
officers.”82
On the other side of the scale, with regard to the privacy interest
at stake, courts are instructed that “[i]n the absence of any basis for
suspecting [a person] of misconduct, the balance between the public
interest and [one’s] right to personal security and privacy tilts in
favor of freedom from police interference.”83 Generally, however, the
Court has viewed checkpoints’ interference on individual liberty as
“slight.”84 Two factors drove the Court to this conclusion.85 First, the
objective level of intrusion was usually low: the duration of the
seizure was short, and the ensuing investigation was not intense.86
Second, the checkpoints were subjectively less intrusive in that they
78. Id.
79. Id. at 42-43.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990).
82. Id. at 453-54.
83. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
84. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52; see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-59
(1976).
85. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-53; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-59.
86. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452. 
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generated no concern or fright in a lawful traveler.87 This is because
the police did not arbitrarily decide which vehicles would be subject
to the checkpoint.88 Rather, police established these checkpoints
well in advance, notified motorists of their existence, and carried
them out according to written guidelines.89
This Part accomplished three tasks. First, it established what
kinds of interactions with the police constitute a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Second, it noted the general rule that, without
some individualized suspicion of past or ongoing criminal activity,
the police cannot seize a person. Lastly, it set out the relevant
framework for determining whether checkpoints (which permit sus-
picionless seizures en masse) are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. With this background established, this Note now turns
to the first issues it set out to explore: (1) whether warrant check-
points at natural disaster shelters are seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, and (2) if so, whether those seizures are “reasonable.”
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANT CHECKPOINTS AT
NATURAL DISASTER SHELTERS
In the first part of this Note’s hypothetical natural disaster
shelter scenario, police employ the same sort of checkpoint that the
Polk County Sheriff ’s Office allegedly employed during Hurricane
Irma: police officers are stationed at each entry point to the shelter
and stop every individual seeking entry, requiring that entrants
either provide identification or fingerprints so that the police can
check the entrants for outstanding warrants.90
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, this Note asks whether
conducting a checkpoint to determine if one has an outstanding
warrant before admitting them to a natural disaster shelter is a
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Such checkpoints are in
fact seizures, because the police actively and intentionally terminate
one’s freedom of movement into the shelter.91 Second, this Note
87. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
88. See id. at 559.
89. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
90. See Nexus Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 29-32.
91. See infra Part II.A.
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then determines whether natural disaster checkpoints for warrants
are “reasonable,” utilizing the Brown v. Texas balancing test.92 In
doing so, this Note will weigh the public interests served by the war-
rant checkpoints and the effectiveness of those checkpoints to serve
those public interests against the significance of the checkpoints’
intrusion upon individual liberty.93 This Note ultimately argues that
because the primary purpose behind such checkpoints is to further
the State’s interest in uncovering evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters fail to
pass constitutional muster.94
This Note turns now to the question of whether warrant check-
points are in fact seizures that implicate the Fourth Amendment.
A. Warrant Checkpoints at Natural Disaster Shelters as Seizures
Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
A state actor’s effort to stop anyone wishing to enter a natural
disaster shelter likely constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment. It appears difficult for the government to distinguish
between stopping an entrant at a natural disaster shelter and
stopping a vehicle at a checkpoint.95 Similar to stopping a vehicle on
a highway, stopping a person from entering a natural disaster
shelter and refusing entry unless the person provides an ID or their
fingerprints clearly “terminat[es]” a person’s “freedom of movement”
into the shelter through intentional means.96 In doing so, the
government seizes every entrant to the natural disaster shelter,
much like it does when operating a DUI checkpoint on a highway.97
Moreover, warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters, DUI
checkpoints, and border checkpoints share another common charac-
teristic: they each restrict one’s freedom of movement in order to
92. 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
93. Id. 
94. See infra Part II.B.3.
95. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-47 (1976).
96. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).
97. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). Notably, in many
checkpoint cases, the government conceded that the checkpoint’s operation gave rise to Fourth
Amendment seizures. See id. (noting that concession was “correct[ ]”); Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 556.
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uncover evidence of ongoing criminal activity in a nonconsensual
encounter.98 In the case of warrant checkpoints at natural disaster
shelters, the government actor demands compliance—the entrant
must provide identification or fingerprints so that the government
may run a warrant check.99 Without compliance, the entrant does
not gain entrance—just like at a DUI checkpoint, where one may
not continue driving without stopping and engaging with the officer
so that the officer may determine whether the driver is intox-
icated.100 Given these circumstances, warrant checkpoints at natural
disaster shelters are nearly indistinguishable from other check-
points that the Court has deemed “seizures” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.101
The government may argue that there is no seizure here at all
because a person has no positive right to enter a shelter. In other
words, the government could assert that it has the right to pre-
condition entry into a public place by requiring the individual to
meet certain requirements. For example, when entering a court-
house, bailiffs require a person to pass through metal detectors at
the front doors to prevent entrants from bringing in weapons,
electronics, or other banned items.102 The Court’s previous check-
point cases, the argument goes, focus on the public’s right to
continue moving about public highways,103 whereas here we are con-
cerned only with one’s ability to enter a certain public area.
This argument likely fails because its logical extension compels
the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment would not apply to, for
instance, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security
98. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34-36 (2000) (narcotics checkpoints);
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447-48 (DUI checkpoints); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-47, 552
(checkpoints at the U.S.-Mexico border for detecting illegal alien trafficking).
99. See Nexus Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 29-32.
100. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447. One could make a U-turn or otherwise avoid the checkpoint
before reaching it, but that factors into how intrusive the checkpoint is, not whether
checkpoint stops are seizures. See id. at 450, 452-53.
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Courts & Judicial Services: Security Precautions, ARLINGTON CTY. GOV’T,
https://courts.arlingtonva.us/security/ [https://perma.cc/WNX9-QNYA].
103. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-
46.
2019] TAKING SHELTER UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1085
screens in airports,104 or to metal detectors in courthouses.105 How-
ever, courts across the country make clear that security checkpoints
as a precondition to boarding an airplane106 or entering a federal
courthouse107 implicate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the
Supreme Court’s dicta in past cases give a strong indication that the
Court would subject these measures to Fourth Amendment scrutiny
(and uphold them as constitutional).108 Indeed, each federal circuit
presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of TSA security
checkpoints found that the Fourth Amendment applied.109
But there is an important distinction, the government will argue,
between a TSA security checkpoint and a warrant checkpoint at a
natural disaster shelter. Even though the government may ac-
knowledge that TSA body scanners constitute a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment,110 it will argue warrant checkpoints at natural
disaster shelters are mere “consensual encounters” rather than
seizures.111 The government will contend that a request for identifi-
cation alone does not automatically give rise to a seizure.112 Thus,
in this situation, a reasonable person would feel free to decline to
submit to the warrant check and subsequent fingerprinting (if
applicable) because the officers’ mere request for identification at
the shelter’s entrance is not a “show of authority.”113 Rather, the
argument goes, by freely providing a driver’s license, the potential
104. See generally Security Screening, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/
security-screening [https://perma.cc/RC72-4383].
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3-4, 10
(D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957-58, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178-81 (3d Cir. 2006).
107. See, e.g., Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d 583, 585-87 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
Legal Aid Soc’y of Orange Cty. v. Crosson, 784 F. Supp. 1127, 1128-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
108. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-48 (“Our holding also does not affect the validity of ...
searches at places like airports and government buildings.”); Daniel S. Harawa, The Post-TSA
Airport: A Constitution Free Zone?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 34 & n.227 (2013). 
109. Harawa, supra note 108, at 34 & n.226, 36-37.
110. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002). Defendants in the Polk
County lawsuit made a similar argument. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint at 9-13, Libre by Nexus v. Judd, No. 2017-CA-003170 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 21,
2017) [hereinafter Judd Motion to Dismiss], https://pro.polkcountyclerk.net/PRO/Public
Search/PublicSearch (for directions to access this material, see supra note 20).
112. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004).
113. See id.; see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
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entrant consents to the performance of the warrant check or
fingerprinting.114 “[A]s long as the police do not convey a message
that compliance with their requests is required,” no seizure
occurs.115
This argument is problematic in two ways. First, it is not accurate
to characterize warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters as
a “request” for one’s identification or fingerprints. In this situation,
police are not requesting entrants to engage in conversation as they
freely enter the shelter. Instead, police stop each shelter entrant
and demand compliance with the warrant check as a prerequisite
for entering the shelter—much like the TSA would demand an
airline passenger to submit to a full body scan as a prerequisite for
boarding their flight,116 or a local police force would demand that a
driver submit to questioning before passing through a DUI check-
point.117 These are not comparable to other “consensual encounters”
like in United States v. Mendenhall, in which a federal agent merely
“asked” a person in an airport terminal if she would show the
agents her passenger ticket and identification.118 It seems quite
difficult for the government to show how requiring that a potential
natural disaster shelter entrant comply with the warrant checkpoint
is constitutionally distinguishable from requiring submission to a
full body scan prior to boarding an airplane.119
Second, regarding the warrant check specifically, the vast major-
ity of courts find that without individualized suspicion that a person
has an outstanding arrest warrant, detentions to perform a warrant
check are not consensual encounters; they are seizures that fall
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.120 In United States v.
114. See, e.g., State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 115-17 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that
a defendant consented to warrant check during consensual street encounter with police).
115. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968).
116. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
117. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
118. 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
119. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 3, 10.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 396-97, 399-401 (6th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, 111 F.3d
515, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam). But see State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 115-17 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).
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Luckett, the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant check performed on
an individual accused of jaywalking was a separate seizure that
unreasonably prolonged the initially lawful seizure for jaywalk-
ing.121 The court ruled that the police had the authority to detain the
accused only for as long as “necessary to obtain satisfactory identifi-
cation” and issue the citation for jaywalking.122 The warrant check,
which also constituted a seizure, could be valid only if police had
reasonable suspicion that there may be an outstanding warrant.123
In a similar vein, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have held that
warrant checks performed during the course of an initially invalid
seizure constituted further seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment where police had no reasonable suspicion to believe
that the suspect might have had an outstanding arrest warrant.124
Further, on two occasions, the Tenth Circuit has held that the
retention of one’s identification for longer than needed to verify the
person’s identity, without reason to suspect that the person has an
outstanding warrant, is an unconstitutional seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.125 Particularly relevant is United States v.
Lopez, in which an officer approached two men standing in the
street late at night in a high-crime area and asked for their
identification.126 Based on his interaction with the individuals, the
officer had no reasonable suspicion to believe that either was en-
gaged in criminal activity, much less that either man had an active
arrest warrant.127 The officer nonetheless took Lopez’s identification
card, instructed Lopez to stand by, and went to his patrol car to run
a warrant check.128 The warrant check took about five minutes.129
The Tenth Circuit held that at the time of the warrant check, the
encounter between Lopez and the officer was no longer consensual
because “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable
person in Lopez’s position would have felt free to terminate the
121. 484 F.2d at 90-91.
122. Id. at 91.
123. Id.
124. Gross, 662 F.3d at 396-97, 399-401; Green, 111 F.3d at 519-20.
125. Lopez, 443 F.3d at 1285-86; United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1066, 1068-69 n.3
(10th Cir. 1995).
126. 443 F.3d at 1282. 
127. Id. at 1282, 1285.
128. Id. at 1282.
129. Id.
1088 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1071
encounter with [the officer].”130 The court emphasized that the
officer held onto Lopez’s driver’s license “longer than necessary to
confirm Lopez’s ident[ity,]” and that taking the license back to his
patrol car rendered Lopez “unable to leave.”131 Thus, the warrant
check itself was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and
without reason to suspect that Lopez had an outstanding arrest
warrant, the seizure was an unreasonable one.132
In the case of natural disaster shelters, police stationed at the
shelter’s entrances have no reason to suspect that any one person
has an outstanding warrant. Despite this lack of individualized sus-
picion, each person is compelled to submit to a warrant check or
fingerprinting if they have no identification—just like a motorist
must submit to police questioning at a highway checkpoint.133 The
warrant check process requires the person to stand and wait while
the officer runs the warrant check in the computer.134 Like in Lopez,
retaining the entrant’s driver’s license during the warrant check
beyond the minimal time necessary to confirm the entrant’s iden-
tity, and not giving the license back until the warrant check is
complete, renders the entrant unable to terminate the encounter.135
Though this process may take only minutes, any detention made
“even momentarily” implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions.136 Thus, warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters are
seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Establishing that warrant checkpoints are seizures, however, is
merely the first step in the constitutional analysis.137 To determine
whether these seizures are constitutional, the next Part analyzes
130. Id. at 1286.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Lopez, 443 F.3d at 1282.
135. See id. at 1286. The government could argue that one could revoke “consent” during
the warrant check and demand their license back. This, however, does not negate the fact that
the initial retention of the license constitutes a seizure. See id. at 1282, 1285. Indeed, even an
airport screening search implicates the Fourth Amendment upon “the passenger’s election to
attempt entry into the secured area of an airport.” United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 961
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
136. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
137. See supra Parts I.A-B.
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whether warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters are rea-
sonable seizures.
B. The Reasonableness of Warrant Checkpoints at Natural
Disaster Shelters
In subjecting warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters to
the three-pronged Brown reasonableness test,138 this Note aims to
address arguments on both sides and determine which has greater
merit. This Part proceeds in three subsections, each dedicated to a
separate prong of the Brown analysis. Because the analysis demon-
strates that a warrant checkpoint appears to primarily serve the
government’s interest in general crime prevention, warrant check-
points at natural disaster shelters are unreasonable seizures in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.139
1. Framing the Public Interest that Warrant Checkpoints
 Address
First, what is the gravity of the public concern at issue here?140 A
future challenger’s characterization of the public interest warrant
checkpoints serve will differ greatly from the government’s charac-
terization. Any government entity seeking to justify a warrant
checkpoint will almost certainly point to the need to ensure the
safety of all of the shelter’s occupants. The argument will likely be
that those with outstanding warrants present a danger to others
within the shelter because of their status as at-large criminals.
Indeed, one recent study suggested that a “substantial proportion
of people” refuse to utilize hurricane shelters because of “a deep
mistrust of other people and a fear of criminal victimization.”141
Perhaps a warrant checkpoint will be justified on more narrow
grounds, as Sheriff Grady Judd attempted to do during Hurricane
138. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
139. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
140. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
141. Ashley K. Farmer et al., Scared of the Shelter from the Storm: Fear of Crime and
Hurricane Shelter Decision Making, 88 SOC. INQUIRY 193, 207-08 (2018). 
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Irma, tweeting: “We cannot and we will not have innocent children
in a shelter with sexual offenders & predators. Period.”142
No doubt that such motivations, particularly the motivation to
keep sexual predators away from children, are noble; yet noble
motivations are not enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard.143 As a challenger will likely (and success-
fully) argue, such motivations carry little weight in the Brown
analysis for two reasons.
First, the Court often relies on the presence of empirical data
supporting the asserted public interest that a checkpoint ad-
dresses.144 In Delaware v. Prouse, the Court—in striking down the
practice of discretionary spot checks of drivers for license and
registration—frowned upon the lack of empirical data supporting
the assertion that the spot checks promote public safety.145 It
specifically pointed out that without some empirical data, “it must
be assumed that finding an unlicensed driver among those who
commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than finding
an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe
of drivers,” thereby weakening the public safety argument.146 In a
later case upholding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints,147
the Supreme Court relied on empirical data that emphasized just
how serious of a danger drunk driving posed to the public.148
Little empirical data exists on crime in hurricane shelters. The
government could point to the vast number of reported rapes, homi-
cides, and other crimes that allegedly occurred in the Louisiana
Superdome during Hurricane Katrina,149 but many of those reports
were unfounded and speculative.150 Even if this (arguably unreli-
142. Polk County Sheriff (@PolkCoSheriff), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2017, 8:16 AM), https://
twitter.com/PolkCoSheriff/status/905449649204584448 [https://perma.cc/GBH2-EB9J].
143. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42-43 (2000).
144. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979).
145. Id. at 658-60, 663. 
146. Id. at 659.
147. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 454-55 (1990).
148. Id. at 451.
149. See, e.g., Scott Gold, Trapped in the Superdome: Refuge Becomes a Hellhole, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 1, 2005, 9:29 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/trapped-in-the-
superdome-refuge-becomes-a-hellhole/ [https://perma.cc/FBX5-4PXH]. 
150. David Carr, More Horrible than Truth: News Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/19/business/media/more-horrible-than-truth-news-reports.
html [https://perma.cc/98X9-F644]. 
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able) data from Hurricane Katrina carries some weight, it simply
does not carry the same weight as statistics detailing, for example,
the rampant societal issue of drunk driving.151 Additionally, unlike
the danger of terrorist attacks in air travel, crime within hurricane
shelters is not so prevalent and obvious an issue that a court could
classify it as an issue “of paramount importance.”152
Second, and even more fatal, is that a warrant checkpoint very
much appears to be a checkpoint whose primary purpose “is to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” a purpose which
the Court has expressly admonished.153 In Edmond, the Court
refused to condone the constitutionality of highway checkpoints
designed to discover and seize narcotic drugs.154 Although removing
narcotics from highways would indeed benefit the community, “[t]he
detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves
broadly the safety of the community.”155 The Court refused to ap-
prove seizures of motorists for stops justified not by individualized
suspicion of narcotics possession, but “only by the generalized and
ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.”156 This
purpose may be valid, however, in times of true emergency, such as
to “thwart an imminent terrorist attack” or to catch a fleeing crim-
inal who will take a particular route.157
Stopping every entrant to a natural disaster shelter to check for
warrants—without any individualized suspicion—closely resembles
what the Court in Edmond refused to recognize as lawful: a
checkpoint to pursue the ends of general crime control.158 Natural
disaster shelters would “no doubt be safer but for the scourge of
[fugitives],”159 but so would any other public place that people can
freely enter. In the situation of warrant checkpoints at natural
disaster shelters, there is simply no prominent public danger, as
151. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
152. See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2006). 
153. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).
154. Id. at 34-35, 41-42.
155. Id. at 42-43.
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 42.
159. Id. at 43.
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evidenced by reliable and extensive empirical data, to justify an
exception to the general requirement that the government have
some individualized suspicion before intentionally terminating
someone’s freedom of movement.160 Thus, because the primary pur-
pose of warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters is “indistin-
guishable from the general interest in crime control,” they are
presumably unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.161
2. The Effectiveness of Warrant Checkpoints in Advancing the
 Asserted Public Interest
The efficacy of warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters
is unlikely to influence the analysis.162 Surely, a warrant checkpoint
will be “effective” in a place such as Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where
there are over 100,000 active arrest warrants for misdemeanors and
serious traffic violations163 in a city with an estimated population
just under 230,000.164 If a court were to accept the purpose behind
warrant checkpoints as valid, then perhaps there is a strong argu-
ment that the checkpoint advances state security interests to a
great degree, given the high likelihood that someone with a warrant
will attempt to enter a natural disaster shelter.165
But what of a checkpoint that seeks to expose convicted sexual
predators and dispel fears that anyone will be exposed to those
dangers in the shelter?166 Given that there is little reliable empirical
160. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); cf. United States v.
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the clear danger of terrorist attacks in
airline travel).
161. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
162. See id. at 34-35, 41-42 (striking down highway checkpoints for narcotics interdiction
as unreasonable, despite the checkpoints having a 9 percent “hit rate”).
163. City of Baton Rouge, City Court Warrants, OPEN DATA BATON ROUGE, https://
data.brla.gov/Public-Safety/City-Court-Warrants/3j5u-jyar [https://perma.cc/TMJ8-T574]. Of
course, not every warrant listed applies to a Baton Rouge resident, see id., but the number of
felony arrest warrants and outstanding federal arrest warrants are also relevant here, see
supra note 26.
164. QuickFacts, Baton Rouge city, Louisiana, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/batonrougecitylouisiana,la/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/Q8BT-
DBSW] (asserted population estimate made on July 1, 2017).
165. Cf. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454-55 (relying positively on the fact that nearly 1.5 percent of
drivers stopped at the sobriety checkpoint were arrested for alcohol impairment).
166. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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data on the amount of rapes that occur in natural disaster
shelters,167 courts will likely subject such a checkpoint to a more
exacting effectiveness analysis.168 Especially in states that require
sexual offenders to obtain a special notation on their driver’s license
that they are a sex offender,169 a general warrant checkpoint (in
order to prevent sexual predators from comingling with children
inside) would likely fail. Given the much more effective and less-
intrusive alternative method of simply looking at each entrant’s
driver’s license in these states, a general check for outstanding
arrest warrants—and not sexual offender status—“does not appear
sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement
practice under the Fourth Amendment.”170
3. Balancing the Public Interests that Warrant Checkpoints
 Advance with Their Intrusion on Privacy
As an initial matter, the Court is clear that a checkpoint which
only serves a state’s general interest in crime prevention cannot
outweigh even a minimal intrusion on privacy.171 However, assum-
ing a court reaches the third prong of the Brown test (the severity
of the intrusion on individual liberty),172 the government has a
strong argument that the intrusion is slight. The Court looks at the
level of intrusion both objectively and subjectively.173 Objectively,
courts look to the “duration of the seizure and the intensity of the
investigation.”174 Subjectively, courts look at “the generating of con-
cern or even fright on the part of lawful [citizens].”175 This subjective
“fear,” the Court urges, is measured not by the fear of one who may
167. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
168. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1979). Though the choice among
“reasonable alternatives” in addressing a “serious public danger” remains with the political
branches and not the courts, Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54, the Supreme Court appears only to give
that deference when there is empirical evidence to support the asserted public danger, see id.
at 454-55; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658-61.
169. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-18(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2718(e) (2016); FLA.
STAT. § 322.141(3) (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-111(E) (2017).
170. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659-60.
171. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
172. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
173. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976).
174. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
175. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
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be caught by the checkpoint, but by the “fear and surprise engen-
dered in law-abiding [citizens].”176
First, it is unlikely that a court will find that warrant checkpoints
at natural disaster shelters carry a significant level of objective
intrusiveness. Presumably, these checkpoints operate fairly quickly,
requiring entrants to give only the information needed to run the
warrant check. This entire process could quite possibly take less
time than it does an officer at a sobriety checkpoint to check a driv-
er’s license and registration.
That some entrants may be pulled aside to provide fingerprints
because they do not have state-issued photo identification does not
appear to increase the objective level of intrusiveness. The challeng-
ers in Martinez-Fuerte argued that the fact that border agents
referred only a small percentage of drivers at border checkpoints to
a secondary inspection area increased the level of objective intru-
sion, and even raised equal protection concerns.177 The Court ex-
pressly rejected these assertions because border patrol agents made
referrals only to conduct a routine and limited inquiry into residence
status, which could not be performed with every driver when traffic
was heavy.178
As the government will correctly argue, the Martinez-Fuerte logic
applies with equal force in the case of fingerprinting at a warrant
checkpoint at a natural disaster shelter. Not every entrant is going
to have to provide fingerprints—just those who are not able to pro-
vide valid identification. This will not increase “the duration of the
seizure and the intensity of the investigation,”179 and perhaps may
decrease the seizure’s duration if the entrant does not have to wait
for the officer to run the background check. Thus, nothing about a
warrant checkpoint’s process at natural disaster shelters raises any
objective concerns about intrusiveness.
In looking to subjective intrusiveness, the Supreme Court differ-
entiates between “[r]oving patrols”180 and traffic checkpoints.181
Historically, the Court has demonstrated concern only with the
176. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
177. 428 U.S. at 560.
178. Id.
179. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
180. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975).
181. E.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452-53.
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subjective intrusiveness of roving police patrols, finding that their
implementation involves an unjustifiably high amount of surprise
and annoyance because the police have essentially unfettered dis-
cretion in stopping whomever they please.182 Traffic checkpoints,
however, do not present the same surprise and annoyance concerns
because the approaching motorist “can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, [and] he can see visible signs of the officers’ author-
ity.”183 Additionally, the Court looks positively on the fact that police
implement traffic checkpoints pursuant to internal guidelines and
that uniformed officers operate the checkpoint.184
In the case of warrant checkpoints at natural disaster shelters, it
seems that, at first glance, the government would have a strong
argument that such a checkpoint does not present a high level of
subjective intrusiveness.185 In this hypothetical, every entrant is
stopped for a brief period of time, and each has to provide either
state-issued identification or fingerprints. Further, every entrant in
line sees uniformed police officers stopping entrants at the front of
the line. As the argument would go, there is simply no element of
fear or surprise presented to “law abiding [entrants] by the nature
of the [checkpoint].”186 This argument would seem to apply with
strong force when police are simply checking an entrant’s driver’s
license for a sexual offender notation. But even in the context of a
broader warrant checkpoint, perhaps the government is right.
Perhaps, no matter how abhorrent one may consider the idea of
making a warrant check a prerequisite for entering a natural disas-
ter shelter, this does not unduly intrude on the ideals that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.187
Certainly, there is an argument that warrant checkpoints at
natural disaster shelters do involve an element of surprise and fear,
especially if potential entrants are not given sufficient notice of the
182. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894-95; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
183. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895.
184. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
185. See Judd Motion to Dismiss, supra note 111, at 13.
186. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
187. Cf. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895 (“[T]he central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to pro-
tect liberty and privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials.”).
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checkpoint’s implementation.188 Traditionally, we associate check-
points with the border or a local highway on Saturday night, when
we can reasonably expect and be on notice that the police might set
up a sobriety checkpoint to catch drunk drivers. The idea of warrant
checkpoints at natural disaster shelters, however, is seemingly
unprecedented.
Yet, consider a city such as Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where the
number of outstanding misdemeanor and traffic warrants is nearly
half the city’s total population.189 By implementing warrant check-
points at natural disaster shelters, Baton Rouge potentially deters
a significant portion of its population from seeking refuge in a state-
sponsored shelter. Instead, it sways that population into making the
precarious decision to confront a natural disaster on their own to
avoid the possibility of going to jail. Such checkpoints may even
deter a law-abiding citizen from going to a state-sponsored shelter,
out of the fear that there is an outstanding arrest warrant that the
citizen is not aware of. Both of these possibilities, a challenger may
argue, could increase the level of intrusiveness of warrant check-
points to unconstitutional levels.
Ultimately, the level of intrusiveness presented is likely immate-
rial because the warrant checkpoint’s ultimate downfall is its clear
and primary purpose as a means to further the state’s “general
interest in crime control.”190 After all, the Court has made clear that
“[i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting [a person] of miscon-
duct, the balance between the public interest and [one’s] right to
personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom.”191 “Without
drawing the line at [checkpoints] designed primarily to serve the
general interest in crime control,” the Court cautions, “the Fourth
Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becom-
ing a routine part of American life.”192 Since warrant checkpoints at
188. This would appear to be an issue in Polk County, Florida, where Sheriff Judd’s tweets,
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text, came just four days before Irma’s landfall on the
Florida mainland; see Perry Stein et al., Hurricane Irma Makes Second Landfall in Florida
and Will Roar Up the State’s Gulf Coast, WASH. POST: POST NATION (Sept. 10, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/09/10/hurricane-irma-makes-landfall-in-
florida-keys-targets-gulf-coast/ [https://perma.cc/2QGC-H64A].
189. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
190. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
191. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
192. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
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natural disaster shelters do nothing more than further a state’s
general interest in crime control, courts must deem them unreason-
able, and therefore unconstitutional, seizures under the Fourth
Amendment.193
Yet, what of person-to-person encounters between ICE agents and
natural disaster shelter occupants in an effort to determine im-
migration status? Do the considerations at play there result in a dif-
ferent outcome? The next Part answers these equally important
questions.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF IMMIGRATION STATUS
ENFORCEMENT AT NATURAL DISASTER SHELTERS
Later in the day, after most entrants have made their way inside
the shelter, ICE agents194 decide to enter the shelter and commingle
with those seeking refuge inside in an effort to weed out any
undocumented immigrants.195 The agents’ methods are simple. If,
based on an interaction with an occupant, the agent develops prob-
able cause that the occupant is an undocumented alien, then the
agent takes down the necessary information to follow up on poten-
tial deportation proceedings.196 This could include gathering the
occupant’s fingerprints for later processing, or even detaining the
occupant in a separate part of the shelter (assuming that the storm
conditions prevent immediate arrest and transportation to an
immigration office).
Unlike a warrant checkpoint, it is even less clear in this situation
if a seizure occurs before the ICE agent develops probable cause
that the person is an undocumented immigrant. Again, if there is
193. See id. at 42-44.
194. State officials could potentially perform this same task without presenting a
federalism issue. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411-12 (2012). This Note, how-
ever, assumes that ICE is the primary agency performing immigration status enforcement.
195. ICE has the statutory authority to—without a warrant—interrogate any person
believed to be an alien regarding their right to be in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)
(2012). But since “no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution,” courts
must determine whether encounters between ICE agents and illegal aliens comport with the
Fourth Amendment. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
196. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1984) (describing an immigration
sweep performed at a worksite).
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no seizure, then the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.197 A
court, then, must make a choice. Is the initial conversation here
between the ICE agent and the (potentially) undocumented immi-
grant in the shelter a consensual encounter that does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment,198 or is there some sort of unreasonable
restraint on liberty present that transforms the encounter into an
unconstitutional seizure?199
Before delving into the analysis, it is important to make clear a
working assumption that applies throughout this Part. This Note
undertakes its analysis assuming that those illegal aliens subject to
warrant checkpoints and immigration status enforcement in natu-
ral disaster shelters have Fourth Amendment rights. That the
Fourth Amendment protects illegal aliens seemed clear from the
Court’s decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, in which the Court heard
(and ruled on) two aliens’ arguments that the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule applied to immigration deportation proceedings.200
The Court’s opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,201 how-
ever, has created some debate over whether all illegal aliens in the
country have Fourth Amendment rights.202 In Verdugo-Urquidez,
the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the
people” refers only “to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection
with this country to be considered part of that community.”203 This
Note assumes that those illegal aliens heading to natural disaster
shelters within the United States satisfy this standard, if it needs
to be met at all. Yet, it is worth noting that the Verdugo-Urquidez
197. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
198. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
199. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 & n.16 (1968). Naturally, this hypothetical inquiry
could differ from the precise facts of a future challenge, and those differences may or may not
have constitutional significance. This exercise will still be useful nonetheless, for patrolling
natural disaster shelters for undocumented immigrants is seemingly unprecedented, and it
is important to analyze the practice’s legality before the issue arises. See supra notes 27-31
and accompanying text.
200. 468 U.S. 1032, 1034-35, 1050 (1984). 
201. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
202. See, e.g., Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 839
(2013).
203. 494 U.S. at 265.
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standard may not be satisfied in all circumstances envisioned by
this Note.
A. Setting the Stage: Defining Consensual Encounters
It is clear that no seizure occurs when an officer simply ap-
proaches an individual in a public place and asks a couple of ques-
tions.204 Such “consensual” encounters fall outside the Fourth
Amendment’s purview as long as a reasonable person would feel at
liberty to ignore the officer’s questions and continue about the per-
son’s business.205 Courts determine whether someone feels “free to
leave” objectively and “presuppose[ ] an innocent person.”206 Only
when the totality of the circumstances of the encounter207 demon-
strates that the officer “convey[ed] a message that compliance with
their requests [was] required”208 is there a seizure that must then be
justified by reasonable suspicion.209
Indeed, in many environments similar to a natural disaster
shelter, the Court has found that no seizure occurred when police
began an encounter with individuals already within a confined
area.210 In these situations, people limited their freedom of move-
ment voluntarily, independent of any coercive police conduct.211
Even when police station themselves at the exits of a worker’s place
of employment212 or near a bus’s only entrance and exit,213 the Court
will not find that a seizure occurred so long as the police do not
204. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 434 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
205. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
206. Id. at 436-38; see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (“[The
reasonableness standard] ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached.”).
207. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17.
208. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435.
209. Id. at 434.
210. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197-98, 204 (2002) (passengers on a
Greyhound bus at a scheduled stop); Delgado, 466 U.S. at 211-12, 218 (workers at their place
of employment); see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431-32, 437-38 (noting that officers approaching
a defendant on an airport bus and asking to inspect his ticket and identification left “some
doubt [as to] whether a seizure occurred”). 
211. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218. 
212. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
213. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197-98.
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prevent someone from exiting.214 Of course, other factors—such as
whether the police demonstrated force, brandished weapons, made
any threats or commands, and spoke with a commanding tone of
voice—are relevant.215 But in the immigration context, when ICE
agents conduct mass sweeps of a place of employment, the Court
seems to focus most on whether workers have a “reasonable fear
that they would be detained upon leaving.”216 That ICE agents
station themselves at the exits is constitutionally immaterial so
long as they do not take affirmative action to prevent a worker from
leaving.217
B. Challenging the “Consensual Encounter” Label for Immigration
Status Enforcement at Natural Disaster Shelters
A future challenger will argue that immigration enforcement at
natural disaster shelters is inherently different. From this perspec-
tive, the decision to go to a natural disaster shelter, unlike the deci-
sion to get on a Greyhound bus218 or even to go to work,219 is not a
wholly voluntary limitation on one’s freedom of movement. For
many people, going to a hurricane shelter is not a choice—it is their
only option.220
Whether it is for a hurricane, for a blizzard, or in the aftermath
of an earthquake, state-sponsored shelters provide refuge for those
who have nowhere else to go, even if they are in this country il-
legally. Indeed, nearly seven million people across Florida and
Georgia were under either voluntary or mandatory evacuation or-
ders as Hurricane Irma approached.221 Reports indicate that over
214. See id. at 204; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218-19.
215. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204.
216. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 219.
217. Id.
218. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
219. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
220. See Dylan Baddour & Avi Selk, Harvey Drives Tens of Thousands to Texas Shelters,




221. Jeremy Berke, Nearly 7 Million People Told to Evacuate in Florida and Georgia as
Hurricane Irma Approaches with 125-MPH Winds, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2017, 12:10 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/hurricane-irma-florida-evacuation-orders-2017-9 [https://
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75,000 people in the state of Florida sought refuge in a state-
sponsored hurricane shelter as Irma approached,222 and nearly
35,000 in Harvey’s path took refuge in state-sponsored shelters,223
with many Texans continuing to file into shelters days after Harvey
made landfall.224
Undoubtedly, the government recognizes the importance of natu-
ral disaster shelters. In recent years, before landfall of several major
hurricanes in areas with significant populations of undocumented
immigrants, ICE and CBP have felt compelled to issue public
statements noting their intent not to enforce the country’s immigra-
tion laws at evacuation shelters.225 ICE and CBP recognize, the
argument would go, that shelters are not a luxury; they are a life-
saving resource for thousands of people.226 Of course, the human-
itarian nature of natural disaster shelters is not enough by itself to
render the conduct in question here a “seizure.”227 However, the life-
or-death nature of the decision to go to the shelter, a challenger will
urge, must play into the totality of the circumstances analysis.228
In the situation posed here, no one can leave the shelter—in part
because they chose to be there, but also in part because a natural
disaster renders it necessary for occupants to be at the shelter in
the first place. With hundreds, if not thousands, of people stationed
in lines of cots and makeshift beds, ICE and CBP agents (presum-
ably armed) begin to walk about the shelter and flash their badges
to everyone, asking questions “relating to their citizenship.”229
perma.cc/RR8A-CEY9].
222. Hurricane Irma: Thousands Stuck in Lines Outside Crowded Florida Shelters, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 9, 2017, 4:41 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-irma-thousands-
stuck-in-lines-outside-crowded-florida-shelters/ [https://perma.cc/C937-V949].
223. Baddour & Selk, supra note 220.
224. Id.
225. See Hurricane Harvey Joint Statement, supra note 4; Hurricane Isaac Joint
Statement, supra note 5; Hurricane Matthew Joint Statement, supra note 5.
226. Cf. Hurricane Harvey Joint Statement, supra note 4 (listing promotion of life-saving
and life-sustaining activities among the highest priorities); Hurricane Isaac Joint Statement,
supra note 5 (same); Hurricane Matthew Joint Statement, supra note 5 (same).
227. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991).
228. See id.
229. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984).
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Perhaps how agents pose the questions,230 or even how many agents
are present,231 is constitutionally significant.
Even if a challenger cannot establish that an immigration sweep
caused a seizure of the entire shelter, the challenger could allege a
Fourth Amendment violation based on the person’s particular inter-
action with an ICE agent.232 That challenger will surely argue for a
reviewing court to follow the reasoning set forth in United States v.
Easley,233 in which a federal district court judge held that race was
a relevant factor in analyzing whether a reasonable person would
feel free to ignore an officer’s questioning.234
That case involved an interaction between federal agents and the
defendant, Easley, a thirty-four-year-old African American woman
who was a passenger on a Greyhound bus stopped at a maintenance
shop at a bus terminal in Albuquerque, New Mexico.235 During this
stop, federal agents questioned passengers—including Easley—
about their itineraries.236 During the interaction, Easley insisted
that a certain suitcase bearing a nametag with the name “Denise
Moore” was not Easley’s.237 The name “Denise Moore” appeared on
the passenger list with the same reservation number as Easley, and
the luggage tag on the bag in question listed the same origin city,
destination city, and contact phone number as Easley’s luggage
tag.238 After confirming that no “Denise Moore” was on board, the
federal agent concluded that the suitcase was abandoned.239 The
agent searched the bag and discovered over 500 grams of metham-
phetamine.240 Based on the agent’s interaction with Easley and the
230. See id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the fact that ICE agents
would “direct pointed questions at the workers,” such as asking a worker to “state where he
was born”).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 219 (majority opinion).
233. 293 F. Supp. 3d 1288 (D.N.M. 2018), rev’d, 911 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 2018). The Tenth
Circuit’s rejection of the lower court’s rationale certainly diminishes the lower court opinion’s
persuasive value. However, nothing bars a future litigant from raising this argument and
seeking to have the lower court’s rationale in Easley adopted elsewhere.
234. Id. at 1308.
235. Id. at 1292.
236. Id. at 1293-94.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1293.
239. Id. at 1294.
240. Id. at 1294, 1296.
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evidence linking Easley to the bag, the agent believed that Easley
owned the suitcase and arrested her.241
Easley moved to suppress the evidence found from the search of
the suitcase, claiming that her abandonment of the bag was invol-
untary because a reasonable person in Easley’s position would not
have felt free to terminate the encounter.242 The court agreed with
Easley.243 In its analysis, the court found that “it is both permissible
and necessary to consider race as part of the totality of the circum-
stances.”244 According to Judge Vázquez, “[o]mitting consideration
of the ways in which race influences encounters with law enforce-
ment and insisting on a colorblind system of justice perpetuates a
system in which constitutional protections are severely weakened
for people of color.”245 If race were ignored in the reasonable person
analysis, then “people who are especially vulnerable to police en-
counters because of their race are systematically disadvantaged in
comparison to people who are not.”246 Based on the fact that the
agent “repeatedly misrepresented his purpose” in asking questions
and searching passengers’ bags, and the fact that “a stream of pas-
sengers” had already agreed to have their bags searched, the court
found that “[i]n the context of an interaction between a white officer
and the only black person on the bus” the agent’s inquiries had
“authoritative and coercive force.”247
Analogously, a future challenger to immigration sweeps at nat-
ural disaster shelters will argue that these sweeps disproportion-
ately target occupants of color, particularly Hispanics and
Latinos.248 Classifying these encounters as consensual, in essence,
will justify federal agents’ use of race as a pretext to stop a person
241. Id. at 1294.
242. Id. at 1301.
243. Id. at 1300.
244. Id. at 1307.
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 1308 (quoting Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 946, 1003 (2002)).
247. Id. at 1308-09.
248. See Jie Zong et al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration
in the United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#
Demographic [https://perma.cc/LQ4Y-Q3WD] (summarizing that 45 percent of immigrants
identify as having Hispanic or Latino origins). 
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without any individualized suspicion at all,249 something that the
Court explicitly disapproved in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.250
In such a high-pressure situation, any person—especially a person
of color—would feel compelled to surrender to questioning and
attempt to convince the ICE agent that the person is not an illegal
alien, thereby transforming the encounter into a seizure.251
To be sure, this argument is not mere conjecture; some empirical
data suggests that a “reasonable person” usually feels compelled to
answer police questioning, even outside of the confines of a natural
disaster shelter.252 According to one study, “most people do not ...
feel free to terminate” encounters with police on a public sidewalk,
“the very type of police encounter that the Supreme Court considers
the clearest example of a completely consensual conversation.”253 In
that context, only 20 percent of study participants said they would
feel free to leave when an officer approaches and says, “I have a few
questions to ask you.”254
Within a natural disaster shelter, a challenger will urge that
anyone would feel compelled to answer questions posed to him or
her by an agent of the federal government.255 That federal agent has
come to the one and only place that is keeping that person safe from
the impending landfall of the storm, or could be the only place
keeping that person out of the elements after a recent earthquake
destroyed what was once their home. The hundreds or thousands of
people within that shelter can see the agents methodically inter-
viewing everyone and sending those who “fail” the questioning to a
separate area, where (unbeknownst to others), that failing individ-
ual will be fingerprinted and more information will be gathered so
that ICE can apprehend the person later. Indeed, a reasonable
person would likely fear that, were the person to decline the agent’s
invitation to talk, they too would be sent off to this unknown area
249. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1584-86 (2011).
250. 422 U.S. 873, 876, 885-86 (1975).
251. See Easley, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1308-09; Carbado & Harris, supra note 249, at 1586.
252. See Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police Encounters, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 326, 337-38 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M.
Solan eds., 2012).
253. Id. at 337.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 337-38.
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of the shelter.256 It is not as if the person has anywhere to go to
avoid this confrontation—due to the weather conditions, the person
cannot simply leave the shelter.
In essence, the argument goes, the government agents here are
using the basic need of human survival at evacuation shelters and
picking out the individuals that simply “do not belong,” absconding
the Fourth Amendment under the guise of a “consensual interac-
tion.” The Constitution cannot be blinded to such an “arbitrary and
oppressive interference ... with the privacy and personal security of
individuals.”257
C. Immigration Status Enforcement Within Natural Disaster
Shelters as “Consensual Encounters”
As the government will likely argue with success, there lies one
major weakness in a future challenger’s arguments: almost all of the
Court’s relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence seemingly com-
pels the conclusion that encounters between ICE agents and persons
within a natural disaster shelter are consensual encounters. The
Court has held that no categorical seizure of all bus passengers
occurred when officers boarded a bus and asked individuals ques-
tions about their itineraries.258 Nor did a categorical seizure of all
factory workers occur when ICE agents swept through a factory and
stationed themselves at every exit.259 It seems to stretch reason,
then, to say that by entering a natural disaster shelter, ICE agents
automatically seize every occupant inside the shelter.
Consider the particular facts of INS v. Delgado and United States
v. Drayton. In Delgado, ICE agents entered various factories and
performed a sweep of the workforce therein in search of illegal
aliens.260 “[S]everal agents” stationed themselves near the factory’s
exits, while others fanned out within the factory “to question most,
256. Cf. id. at 338 (finding that people are “unaffected” by warnings given to them by police
that they have the right to refuse to give consent because “they do not believe them—they feel
that they will be searched regardless of whether or not they consent”).
257. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (citations omitted).
258. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197-98, 203 (2002).
259. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 211-13, 218 (1984).
260. See id. at 211-13. The opinion does not disclose how many ICE agents performed the
sweep. See id.
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but not all, employees at their work stations.”261 Agents carried
guns, walkie-talkies, and badges, and they asked employees “one to
three questions relating to their citizenship.”262
Even under these circumstances, the Court held that ICE agents
did not seize the entire factory.263 The mass questioning of each em-
ployee, the Court found, “should have given [employees] no reason
to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful answers
... or if they simply refused to answer.”264 The Court rejected the
argument that the agents stationed at the door prevented employees
from leaving, thereby constituting a seizure.265 In the Court’s eyes,
the employees already voluntarily restricted their freedom of move-
ment simply by showing up to work, and the agents did nothing to
prevent people from moving about the factory or even prevent them
from leaving.266 “[T]he mere possibility that [employees] would be
questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have re-
sulted in any reasonable apprehension by any [employees] that they
would be seized or detained in any meaningful way.”267
In United States v. Drayton, three officers boarded a Greyhound
bus while it was at a scheduled stop and spoke with individual pas-
sengers on the bus as part of a drug and weapons interdiction ef-
fort.268 One officer “knelt on the driver’s seat and faced the rear of
the bus”; one officer went to the back of the bus and remained there;
and the other spoke with individual passengers, starting at the rear
and methodically working his way up to the front.269 The question-
ing officer, in order to “avoid blocking the aisle,” either “stood next
261. Id. at 212. One may urge that the fact that agents had a warrant to go to two of the
factories is an important fact. See id. However, this fact may be trivial in analyzing whether
the employees were seized, as the Court noted that “neither of the search warrants identified
any particular illegal aliens by name,” indicating that agents had no probable cause to believe
that a specific employee was an illegal alien. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 218-19.
264. Id. at 218.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 218-19.
267. Id. at 219; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (articulating that where
one’s freedom of movement is restricted through a self-imposed, voluntary condition, the
question to ask is not whether the person felt “free to leave,” but “whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”).
268. 536 U.S. 194, 197-98 (2002).
269. Id. 
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to or just behind each [seated] passenger.”270 The interviewing
officer testified that anyone “who declined to cooperate with him or
who chose to exit the bus ... would have been allowed to do so
without argument.”271 In the particular encounter challenged, the
officer displayed his badge, stated his purpose for being on the bus,
and asked the passenger if he had any bags on the bus.272 The
officer’s face was about a foot away from the passenger’s during the
encounter.273
The Court again held that the officers’ conduct in questioning bus
passengers did not constitute a seizure of the entire bus.274 The
Court found that there was no reason for passengers to believe that
they were required to answer the questions; indeed, the Court found
that “nothing [the officer] said would suggest to a reasonable person
that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise termi-
nating the encounter.”275 Without the officer making any intimidat-
ing movements, brandishing his weapon, talking in a demanding
tone of voice, or otherwise blocking the aisle, the Court held that the
encounter was consensual.276 The Court even went a step further:
“Indeed, because many fellow passengers [were] present to witness
officers’ conduct, a reasonable person may feel even more secure in
his or her decision not to cooperate with police on a bus than in oth-
er circumstances.”277
Encounters between ICE agents and people within natural
disaster shelters are nearly indistinguishable from those consensual
encounters that occur on a bus or in one’s place of employment. Just
as when at work, freedom of movement within the shelter is
restricted because of the voluntary choice to enter the shelter.278
Even assuming that weather conditions prevent a person from
leaving the shelter altogether, the Supreme Court is clear that the
focus is not on whether the shelter occupant would feel free to leave




274. Id. at 203.
275. Id. at 203-04.
276. Id. at 204.
277. Id.
278. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984).
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the shelter, but instead on whether the occupant would feel free to
decline answering questions or “terminate the encounter.”279 Even
within the cramped confines of a Greyhound bus, where an officer
looms over a passenger (and with two other officers standing watch),
the Court instructs that unless the aisle is blocked, or the officer
makes some overwhelming show of force, no reasonable person
would feel compelled to answer the officer’s questions.280 Further,
questions related to one’s identity or requests for identification
alone do not give rise to a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.281
A future challenger would have difficulty arguing that, generally
speaking, there is something more inherently intimidating about
approaching an individual within a shelter and asking them a
couple of questions relating to their identity as a United States
citizen or an illegal alien than doing the same thing on a bus.282
In addressing an individual occupant’s seizure claim, the gov-
ernment will correctly contend that a court should not consider race
as a factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis. The “rea-
sonable person” standard promotes “consistent application from one
police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s
response to the actions of the police.”283 By analyzing what a rea-
sonable person would do from an objective standpoint, police are
able to determine ex ante whether their conduct may violate the
Fourth Amendment.284 While courts cannot tolerate an officer’s de-
cision to investigate a person based solely on their race,285 courts
must also ensure that “the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual
being approached.”286 Subjective considerations, such as race, are
279. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
280. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197-98, 203-04.
281. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (plurality
opinion)).
282. See United States v. Angulo-Guerrero, 328 F.3d 449, 450-51 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding
no seizure where Immigration and Naturalization Service agents conducting immigration
inspection operations questioned an illegal alien on a Greyhound bus while it was at a sched-
uled stop).
283. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988).
284. Id.; United States v. Easley, 911 F.3d 1074, 1082 (10th Cir. 2018).
285. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975).
286. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574; see Easley, 911 F.3d at 1082 (finding that because people
of color have unique life experiences, “there is no uniform way to apply a reasonable person
test that adequately accounts for racial differences consistent with an objective standard for
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proper when determining whether police coerced a particular
individual into consenting to a search.287 When it comes to determin-
ing whether the police seized an individual, courts must continue to
measure objectively what a “reasonable person” would do so that the
police may know whether their conduct generally comports with an
individual’s constitutional rights.288
In sum, any reasonable person—measured from the perspective
of a law-abiding person289—would feel free to ignore the officer and
continue about the person’s business in the shelter. Even if some
shelter occupants see agents interviewing other occupants, this
conduct should give occupants “no reason to believe that they would
be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to
them or if they simply refused to answer.”290 That many people will
choose to answer, without being told that they do not have to an-
swer, does nothing to vitiate the fact that the encounter is consen-
sual.291 Roaming the halls of a natural disaster shelter to inquire
into the occupants’ immigration status, generally,292 is simply not a
“seizure” of all of the shelter’s occupants under the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.293
Fourth Amendment seizures”).
287. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973); see also Easley, 911 F.3d at
1081-82.
288. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574; see Easley, 911 F.3d at 1082. As the Tenth Circuit noted
in Easley, adding subjective considerations such as race into the objective Fourth Amendment
seizure analysis could potentially “raise[ ] serious equal protection concerns if it could result
in different treatment for those who are otherwise similarly situated.” Easley, 911 F.3d at
1082.
289. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
290. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194, 204 (2002) (“[B]ecause many fellow passengers [were] present to witness officers’ conduct,
a reasonable person may feel even more secure in his or her decision not to cooperate with
police.”).
291. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
292. Finding that immigration sweeps do not constitute a seizure of the entire shelter does
not foreclose the possibility that an ICE agent violated a particular occupant’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights based on the facts and circumstances of that specific encounter. See id. at 219. 
293. A future challenger should determine whether the state constitution and state
common law governing searches and seizures grant protections greater than the Constitution,
as state law often provides broader protection. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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CONCLUSION
This Note analyzed the constitutionality of two different hypo-
thetical policing methods at state-sponsored natural disaster shel-
ters: (1) requiring each entrant to submit to a warrant check before
entering,294 and (2) conducting immigration status enforcement
sweeps within the shelter.295 Despite one’s potential intuitions, the
Fourth Amendment does not appear to shelter individuals from all
police conduct within natural disaster shelters.296 While the Su-
preme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence counsels the find-
ing that checking each entrant for warrants prior to entry is an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment,297 that same
jurisprudence seemingly mandates the finding that the Fourth
Amendment does not limit ICE agents from conducting immigration
status sweeps in the shelter.298
In an ideal world, the analysis contained in this Note will never
actually be needed. But, given the concerns stated in the Introduc-
tion to this Note, it seems more and more likely that these concerns
will arise. This Note serves as a guide to future parties to litigation
arising out of situations such as those contemplated herein, and
raises awareness to the fact that the Fourth Amendment—as con-
strued by the Supreme Court—may not apply to all types of gov-
ernment activity within natural disaster shelters. The reality of the
Fourth Amendment’s limited umbrella of protections in state-
sponsored shelters is potentially a single disaster away.
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